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Abstract	  
The	  philosopher	  Bourahima	  Ouattara	  claims	  that	  Africans	  have	  a	  unique	  feature	  that	  
can	  help	  them	  fight	  against	  the	  West’s	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  intellectual	  hegemony	  
and	  therefore	  against	  globalization.	  This	  feature	  is	  that	  of	  ‘being’	  outside	  of	  all	  
conceptuality.	  Being	  outside	  (or	  being-­‐third),	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africans	  are	  therefore	  
able	  to	  expose	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  West’s	  mighty	  power:	  the	  stubborn	  repetition	  of	  
its	  founding	  principle:	  the	  concept.	  Instead	  of	  just	  emulating	  concepts	  from	  former	  
colonies	  or	  avidly	  promoted	  by	  global	  capitalism,	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  should,	  
according	  to	  him,	  unhinge	  itself	  from	  the	  concept	  in	  order	  to	  undermine	  the	  
concept-­‐driven	  modernity	  that	  marks	  our	  world’s	  destiny.	  Can	  Bourahima	  Ouattara’s	  
bold	  claim	  really	  work?	  Should	  we	  all—i.e.	  not	  just	  Africans—listen	  to	  him?	  This	  
essay	  tries	  not	  only	  to	  make	  sense,	  but	  also	  to	  test	  this	  ambitious	  attempt	  to	  
undermine	  the	  arrogance	  and	  imperialism	  of	  the	  concept,	  this	  cornerstone	  of	  
western	  philosophy	  since	  Plato.	  	  
	  	  
Résumé	  
Le	  philosophe	  Bourahima	  Ouattara	  nous	  dit	  que	  les	  Africains	  ont	  une	  caractéristique	  
unique	  qui	  peut	  les	  aider	  à	  combattre	  l’hégémonie	  économique,	  culturelle	  et	  
intellectuelle	  de	  l'occident	  et	  donc	  à	  lutter	  contre	  la	  mondialisation	  dominante.	  
Cette	  caractéristique	  est	  celle	  ‘d'être’	  l’autre	  de	  toute	  conceptualité.	  Étant	  l’autre	  de	  
l’autre	  (ou	  ‘être-­‐en-­‐tiers’),	  les	  Africains	  subsahariens	  peuvent	  donc	  exposer	  la	  
faiblesse	  de	  l'occident	  :	  la	  répétition	  jamais	  suffisamment	  achevée	  de	  son	  principe	  
fondateur	  :	  le	  concept.	  Au	  lieu	  de	  simplement	  suivre	  ou	  imiter	  les	  concepts	  et	  donc	  
les	  valeurs	  des	  anciennes	  colonies,	  toujours	  avidement	  promus	  par	  le	  capitalisme	  
mondial,	  l'Afrique	  subsaharienne	  devrait,	  selon	  lui,	  se	  ‘decrocher’	  du	  concept	  de	  
façon	  à	  saper	  l’axe	  modernité	  /	  concept,	  cet	  axe	  qui	  marque	  le	  destin	  du	  monde.	  Se	  
peut-­‐il	  que	  Bourahima	  Ouattara	  ait	  raison?	  Devrions-­‐nous	  tous—et	  non	  pas	  
seulement	  l’Afrique—l’écouter	  et	  nous	  ‘decrocher’	  ainsi	  du	  concept?	  Cet	  essai	  a	  
deux	  buts:	  présenter	  brièvement	  l’œuvre	  de	  B.	  Ouattara	  et	  tester	  cette	  tentative	  
ambitieuse	  de	  ruiner	  l'arrogance	  et	  l'impérialisme	  du	  concept,	  cette	  pierre	  angulaire	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Fifty	  years	  ago,	  in	  a	  lecture	  given	  on	  the	  19	  March	  1965	  at	  the	  Goethe	  Institute	  in	  
Kinshasa,	  then	  called	  Leopoldville,	  the	  Belgian	  logician,	  Franz	  Crahay,	  made	  a	  
suggestion,	  that,	  in	  insight,	  was	  at	  once	  both	  remarkable	  and	  eminently	  problematic:	  
he	  said	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  philosophy,	  Africans	  needed	  a	  conceptual	  take-­‐off.	  	  
	  
There	  will	  be	  no	  Bantu	  philosophy	  without	  an	  undertaking	  such	  as	  a	  conceptual	  
take-­‐off	  […]	  the	  purposeful	  entry	  into	  an	  age	  of	  mature,	  critical,	  autocritical,	  and	  
constructive	  thought.	  (Crahay	  1965:	  67)	  
	  
With	  this	  suggestion,	  Crahay	  made	  a	  controversial	  two-­‐time	  call:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
he	  defended	  the	  fact	  that	  Africans	  have	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  world	  that	  indeed	  needed	  to	  
be	  conceptualized	  and	  promoted	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  he	  coerced	  African	  thinkers	  to	  
align	  themselves	  to	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  concept	  imposed	  by	  the	  colonizer.	  This	  
double-­‐bind	  has	  plagued	  all	  African	  thinkers	  ever	  since1:	  should	  African	  thought	  
maintain	  its	  intuitive	  or	  immediate	  nature	  or	  should	  it	  align	  itself	  with	  a	  globalizing	  
trend	  started	  in	  Greece,	  for	  which,	  philosophical	  language	  is	  not	  a	  language	  of	  
experience	  but	  a	  language	  about	  experience.	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  two-­‐time	  call,	  Crahay	  made	  an	  even	  more	  problematic	  move:	  he	  
prevented	  Africans	  from	  claiming	  any	  right	  to	  difference.	  	  
	  
Another	  prejudicial	  temptation	  is	  to	  give	  importance	  to	  originality,	  or	  rather,	  to	  
the	  cult	  of	  African	  difference	  […]	  Basically,	  an	  Africanization	  that	  would	  motivate	  
above	  all	  the	  desire	  to	  differentiate	  oneself	  at	  any	  price	  would	  be	  a	  wrong	  road	  
because	  it	  would	  lead	  back	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  ‘reflectors’.	  (Crahay,	  
1965:	  76)	  	  
	  
With	  this	  incredibly	  patronizing	  suggestion,	  Crahay	  deliberately	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  
all	  future	  African	  philosophy:	  The	  only	  way	  African	  philosophy	  would	  be	  able	  to	  take	  
off	  is	  if	  it	  abandoned	  all	  desire	  to	  affirm	  originality	  or	  proclaim	  a	  right	  to	  a	  future	  that	  
would	  express	  their	  vision	  of	  the	  world.	  By	  putting	  the	  breaks	  on	  the	  cult	  of	  
difference,	  Africans	  will	  then,	  ‘with	  the	  help	  of	  universalizing	  procedures,’	  be	  able	  to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  world’s	  philosophical	  progress	  as	  dictated	  by	  the	  West.	  In	  other	  
words,	  abide	  to	  the	  universalization	  of	  the	  Western	  concept	  or	  remain	  silent	  for	  your	  
cultural	  endeavors	  and	  systems	  of	  thought	  are	  simply	  peripheral	  to	  the	  world’s	  
progress.	  	  
	  
Nearly	  forty	  years	  later,	  the	  philosopher	  Bourahima	  Ouattara	  returned	  to	  the	  
problem	  of	  this	  supposed	  conceptual	  take	  off,	  asking	  instead	  a	  much	  more	  pertinent	  
and	  dangerous	  set	  of	  questions:	  what	  if,	  by	  its	  very	  structure,	  African	  thought	  was	  in	  
fact	  allergic	  to	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  concept?	  What	  if	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  structured	  
itself	  not	  in	  a-­‐conceptuality,	  that	  is,	  in	  a	  system	  of	  irrational	  or	  illogical	  beliefs	  totally	  
alien	  to	  the	  process	  of	  rationalization	  imposed	  by	  the	  West,	  but	  in	  the	  other	  of	  
conceptualization	  itself?	  With	  these	  risky	  questions,	  Ouattara	  not	  only	  goes	  against	  
Crahay’s	  calls	  for	  an	  African	  conceptual	  take	  off,	  he	  also	  makes	  an	  unprecedented	  
shift	  in	  thought:	  Africans	  should	  neither	  claim	  their	  right	  to	  difference	  nor	  abide	  to	  
the	  universalizing	  process	  of	  the	  global	  concept,	  but	  highlight	  instead	  their	  inherent	  
différance,	  that	  is,	  their	  facticity,	  one	  which	  continually	  defers	  and	  differs	  the	  very	  
possibility	  of	  the	  western	  concept.	  For	  Ouattara,	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  with	  its	  
extraordinary	  history	  of	  alienation,	  stands	  in	  fact	  for	  the	  destabilization	  of	  rationality	  
itself,	  and	  thus	  for	  the	  very	  subversion	  of	  the	  supposed	  ‘progress’	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
But	  how	  can	  Ouattara	  make	  such	  an	  extraordinary	  call	  and	  how	  does	  he	  justify	  this	  
unprecedented	  non-­‐conceptual	  move	  in	  a	  world	  awash	  with	  concepts	  and	  




Bourahima	  Ouattara	  was	  born	  in	  Côte	  d’Ivoire	  and	  is	  currently	  based	  in	  Switzerland.	  
He	  is	  a	  lecturer	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Basel	  where	  he	  teaches	  a	  course	  on	  ‘la	  religion	  
dans	  le	  roman	  négro-­‐africain	  francophone’.	  His	  main	  area	  of	  specialization	  is	  modern	  
and	  contemporary	  continental	  philosophy,	  with	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
Adorno	  and	  Heidegger	  as	  well	  as	  francophone	  literature.	  He	  also	  has	  a	  very	  specific	  
take	  on	  (mainly)	  Francophone	  African	  philosophy,	  which	  I	  hope	  to	  expose	  succinctly	  
in	  this	  essay.	  Although	  he	  has	  received	  little	  recognition	  amongst	  his	  peers,2	  he	  
continues	  to	  be	  an	  incredibly	  prolific	  writer.	  His	  books	  in	  philosophy	  and	  critical	  
theory	  include,	  starting	  from	  his	  published	  PhD:	  
	  
Adorno	  et	  Heidegger	  :	  une	  controverse	  philosophique,	  1999	  
Adorno:	  Philosophie	  et	  Ethique,	  1999	  
Ontologie	  de	  la	  pauvreté	  chez	  Heidegger,	  Divinatio,	  2001	  
Penser	  l’Afrique	  suivi	  de	  l’Afrique	  «	  fragmentée	  »,	  2001	  
Adorno,	  une	  éthique	  de	  la	  souffrance,	  2004	  
Senghor,	  lecteur	  de	  Barrès,	  2014	  
Patrice	  Lumumba,	  une	  iconographie	  politique	  (forthcoming)	  
Figures	  de	  la	  haine	  de	  soi	  dans	  le	  roman	  négro-­‐africain	  francophone	  (forthcoming)	  
	  
His	  writing	  is	  exceptional	  in	  its	  complexity	  and	  richness:	  sentences	  are	  often	  
incredibly	  condensed,	  crammed	  with	  many	  thoughts;	  the	  discourse	  is	  often	  poetic	  
and	  evocative,	  but	  never	  affected	  or	  gratuitous;	  and	  the	  vocabulary	  is	  strikingly	  
diverse	  and	  productive,	  often	  recalling	  the	  richness	  of	  language	  of	  a	  philosopher	  like	  
Heidegger.	  Reading	  Ouattara	  is	  an	  experience	  that	  is	  as	  fulfilling	  as	  that	  provided	  by	  
the	  most	  eloquent	  of	  philosophies.	  
	  
He	  is	  also	  a	  novelist.	  His	  first	  novel,	  Le	  Cimetière	  sénégalais,	  published	  by	  
L’Harmattan	  in	  2006	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  Djibril,	  an	  immigrant	  from	  a	  generic	  African	  
state	  who	  not	  only	  encounters	  the	  prejudices	  of	  a	  provincial	  French	  town;	  he	  also	  
goes	  back	  to	  his	  roots	  with	  the	  discovery,	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  town,	  of	  an	  abandoned	  
cemetery	  of	  Senegalese	  soldiers	  who	  lost	  their	  lives	  during	  the	  second	  world	  war.	  
Ouattara’s	  aim	  with	  this	  first	  novel	  is	  to	  reveal	  through	  the	  character	  of	  Djibril	  not	  
only	  the	  position	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  considered	  of	  no	  consequence,	  but	  also	  of	  a	  
world	  that	  has	  been	  exempt	  from	  official	  history.	  Djibril	  and	  the	  exploited	  country	  of	  
his	  origins	  expose	  the	  undertow	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  left-­‐aside	  in	  the	  hegemonic	  games	  
of	  domination	  and	  power.	  The	  novel	  is	  written	  in	  a	  quasi-­‐poetic	  prose	  with	  
occasional	  side-­‐glances	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  philosophical	  argumentation	  with	  the	  use	  
of	  dialogue	  between	  the	  protagonists.	  	  
	  
Not	  unlike	  the	  two	  main	  thinkers	  who	  have	  influenced	  his	  thought	  (Adorno	  and	  
Heidegger),	  Ouattara	  is	  a	  non-­‐conformist	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  grand	  narratives	  of	  the	  
western	  world.	  In	  a	  revealing	  commentary	  on	  Adorno’s	  work,	  he	  writes,	  	  
	  
Within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  vast	  movement	  of	  globalization	  (which	  also	  comes	  
across	  as	  a	  process	  of	  universalization),	  one	  which	  suppresses	  alterities	  and	  
singularities,	  the	  idea	  of	  participating	  in	  economic	  development	  goes	  hand	  in	  
hand	  with	  a	  blind	  conformism	  and	  an	  inherently	  unquestioning	  reproduction	  of	  
western	  paradigms,	  even	  if	  they	  have	  already	  exposed	  their	  limits.	  Adorno	  is	  
without	  doubt	  a	  dissident	  of	  the	  western	  world,	  its	  pseudo-­‐humanism,	  its	  
instrumental	  rationality,	  its	  technological	  might,	  and	  the	  conceit	  it	  calls	  progress.	  
(Ouattara	  1999b:	  69)3	  
	  
Ouattara’s	  work	  very	  much	  follows	  in	  Adorno’s	  footsteps.	  His	  attitude	  of	  suspicion	  
towards	  what	  supposedly	  makes	  Western	  rationality	  so	  powerful,	  exposes	  a	  type	  of	  
thought	  that	  is	  unique	  in	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  perpetually	  in	  a	  state	  of	  questioning,	  never	  
leaving	  a	  stone	  unturned,	  always	  in	  a	  state	  of	  alert	  against	  a	  complacent	  thinking.	  As	  
such,	  his	  thought	  incarnates,	  as	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  show,	  the	  non-­‐concept	  he	  puts	  
forward.	  
	  
Another	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  Ouattara’s	  thought	  is	  that	  his	  work	  always	  appears	  to	  start	  
at	  the	  juncture	  between	  philosophy	  and	  ethnography.	  However,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  this	  
is	  not	  a	  call	  for	  a	  return	  to	  ethnophilosophy	  or	  even	  a	  request	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  
debates	  surrounding	  its	  death.	  Ouattara	  attempts	  instead	  to	  think	  at	  this	  crossroad	  
of	  practices,	  right	  where	  philosophy	  ends	  and	  ethnography	  takes	  over	  and	  vice	  
versa.	  This	  juncture	  or	  crossroad	  no	  longer	  concerns	  disciplines	  with	  rigid	  
institutional	  discourses	  and	  it	  no	  longer	  concerns	  either	  abstracted	  epistemic	  games	  
or	  the	  study	  of	  the	  other	  as	  if	  an	  objectified	  given.	  It	  concerns	  the	  way	  thought	  
exposes	  itself:	  always	  situated	  within	  a	  specific	  ethnographic	  context	  and	  yet	  also	  
always	  in	  flight	  from	  such	  context.	  As	  he	  says:	  	  
	  
What	  I	  call	  the	  ethnological	  figures	  of	  the	  thought	  of	  Being	  corresponds	  to	  the	  
end	  of	  philosophy	  as	  the	  site	  of	  a	  new	  beginning.	  As	  such,	  what	  concerns	  me,	  is	  
the	  thought	  of	  the	  Other	  as	  it	  reveals	  itself	  for	  itself.	  (Ouattara	  2000:	  81)	  	  
	  
This	  thought	  is,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  eminently	  political	  because	  it	  is	  free	  from	  
institutionalization	  and,	  as	  such,	  focuses	  on	  the	  actual	  conditions	  that	  make	  it	  
happen,	  i.e.	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  site	  of	  its	  emergence.	  
	  
West/East	  and	  Africa	  as	  Punch-­‐Bag	  
	  
So	  how	  does	  Bourahima	  Ouattara	  take	  up	  Franz	  Crahay’s	  question	  and	  how	  does	  he	  
manage	  to	  put	  forward	  the	  idea	  that	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  is	  the	  other	  of	  
conceptualization	  itself?	  In	  order	  to	  introduce	  the	  issue,	  I	  would	  like	  first	  to	  
emphasize	  the	  key	  influences	  that	  have	  led	  him	  to	  this	  provocative	  thought.	  Two	  
authors	  dominate	  this	  thinking.	  
	  
Firstly,	  Adorno.	  In	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  advent	  of	  scientific	  reason	  in	  the	  18th	  and	  19th	  
Century,	  Ouattara	  highlights	  that	  it	  is	  Adorno	  who	  first	  decides	  to	  shy	  away	  from	  the	  
concept	  because	  it	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  all	  scientific	  enquiries	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  
enlightenment.	  He	  writes	  in	  Adorno:	  Philosophie	  et	  Ethique:	  	  
	  
The	  18th	  and	  19th	  Century	  [...]	  stand	  for	  a	  time	  of	  concept-­‐ion,	  of	  world-­‐making	  
and	  disintegration,	  of	  constructions	  and	  dislocations;	  a	  time	  where	  the	  ground	  
under	  Hegel’s	  foot	  caves	  in	  under	  pressure.	  Adorno	  is	  aware	  of	  all	  this	  when	  he	  
decides	  to	  shun	  the	  West’s	  most	  elevated	  idea:	  the	  concept,	  this	  totalitarian	  
machinery	  that	  supports	  and	  justifies	  dominations	  of	  all	  kind.	  (Ouattara,	  1999b:	  
81)	  	  
	  
Although	  as	  a	  philosopher	  aware	  that	  his	  task	  is	  the	  invention	  of	  concepts,	  Ouattara	  
nonetheless	  follows	  in	  Adorno’s	  footsteps,	  devising	  in	  the	  process	  a	  body	  of	  work	  
that	  adheres	  to	  the	  same	  philosophical	  determination,	  one	  for	  which	  negative	  
dialectics	  takes	  precedence	  over	  any	  positive	  systematization	  of	  thought.	  	  
	  
In	  his	  analysis	  of	  Heidegger’s	  work,	  Ouattara	  also	  highlights	  that	  the	  author	  of	  Being	  
and	  Time	  has	  essentially	  devoted	  all	  his	  work	  to	  debunk	  philosophy	  from	  the	  concept	  
and	  to	  offer	  a	  body	  of	  thought	  in	  which	  Being	  is	  no	  longer	  riveted	  to	  a	  concept.	  	  
	  
In	  his	  long	  engagement	  with	  the	  discipline	  of	  metaphysics,	  Heidegger	  managed	  to	  
hollow	  out	  all	  of	  the	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  structure	  that	  underpinned	  it,	  
weakening	  its	  pedestal	  of	  sense	  and	  signification.	  The	  concept	  becomes	  thus	  
negated,	  prevented	  from	  taking	  off	  [...]	  In	  doing	  so,	  Heidegger	  inaugurates	  the	  
end	  of	  Western	  philosophy.	  (Ouattara	  2000:	  79)	  	  
	  
It	  is	  precisely	  on	  the	  ruins	  left	  behind	  by	  Heidegger	  that	  Ouattara	  begins	  his	  work	  
and	  specifically	  his	  reflection	  on	  African	  thought.	  Instead	  of	  departing	  from	  the	  
position	  of	  mastery	  that	  the	  (Western)	  subject	  has	  assumed	  thus	  far,	  Ouattara	  
begins	  his	  investigations	  from	  the	  indetermination	  of	  Being,	  one	  that	  refuses	  all	  
conceptuality.	  ‘Being	  is	  precisely	  that	  which	  invalidates	  the	  concept:	  it	  is	  ante-­‐
conceptual;	  what	  precisely	  operates	  before	  any	  predication’	  (Ouattara	  2000:	  79).	  
From	  this	  starting	  point—a	  point	  that	  suffers	  no	  origin	  per	  se—,	  Ouattara	  
inaugurates	  a	  new	  path	  in	  post-­‐philosophy,	  one	  for	  which	  the	  ante-­‐conceptuality	  of	  
being,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  allows	  him	  to	  approach	  the	  issue	  of	  African	  philosophy	  from	  a	  
radically	  new	  angle,	  one	  that	  allows	  for	  a	  new	  political	  stance	  against	  all	  forms	  of	  
hegemonies.4	  
	  
Liberated	  from	  the	  fetishism	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  strong	  of	  his	  close	  reading	  of	  these	  
authors,	  Ouattara	  starts	  his	  analyses	  on	  Africa	  from	  the	  following	  premise:	  
	  
The	  world	  is	  dominated	  by	  a	  two-­‐faceted	  historical	  narrative:	  Same/Other,	  
Greek/Jew,	  Occident/Orient,	  West/East.5	  The	  two	  poles	  of	  this	  narrative	  
complement	  each	  other	  in	  that	  they	  have	  given	  the	  world	  its	  most	  distinctive	  
feature:	  writing	  (the	  Dispilio	  Tablet,	  for	  example)	  and	  the	  Book	  (the	  three-­‐fold	  
narrative	  provided	  by	  the	  Abrahamic	  religions,	  to	  take	  one	  example	  amongst	  others).	  
As	  Ouattara	  says,	  ‘the	  bipolar	  historical	  narrative	  of	  the	  world	  gratify	  themselves	  in	  
having	  given	  humanity	  its	  most	  distinctive	  features:	  Writing	  and	  the	  Book’	  (Ouattara	  
2000:	  126).	  With	  this	  singular	  advent,	  the	  dialogue	  thus	  becomes	  closed-­‐off,	  there	  
can	  be	  no	  other	  mode	  of	  operating	  and	  no	  other	  thought	  than	  that	  provided	  by	  the	  
founding	  fathers	  of	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  civilizations,	  with	  its	  distinctive	  emphasis	  
on	  concepts,	  subjects	  and	  objects.	  Highlighting	  this	  two-­‐faceted	  historical	  narrative	  is	  
not	  an	  attempt	  to	  denigrate	  the	  global	  significance	  of	  its	  achievements	  or	  to	  grossly	  
ignore	  the	  particularities	  of	  its	  varied	  manifestations	  (Indian	  Modernism,	  for	  
example6),	  only	  to	  underline	  what	  ultimately	  is	  omitted	  in	  this	  advent,	  what	  evades	  
both	  writing	  and	  the	  Book,	  that	  is,	  what	  remains	  without	  name,	  and	  therefore	  
without	  concept	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
It	  doesn’t	  take	  much	  to	  see	  what	  remains	  without	  name	  and	  thereby	  without	  
concept	  in	  the	  long	  history	  of	  alienation	  and	  oppression	  that	  stemmed	  from	  this	  
advent.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  contributions	  to	  world	  history,	  Africa	  
is	  indeed	  the	  absent	  one.	  As	  Ouattara	  says,	  ‘Africa	  comes	  third	  in	  this	  encounter	  
made	  of	  arrogance,	  superiority	  and	  domination’(Ouattara	  2001b:	  126).	  The	  position	  
of	  being-­‐third	  is	  crucial	  for	  it	  is	  at	  once	  the	  position	  of	  conscience	  and	  what	  remains	  
silent	  in	  the	  dialogue	  Same/Other,	  Greek/Jew,	  Occident/Orient,	  West/East.	  The	  third	  
is	  the	  silent	  witness	  and	  inevitably,	  the	  site	  of	  in-­‐justice.	  In	  front	  of	  the	  infinite	  
hermeneutic	  of	  concepts	  that	  stem	  from	  writing	  and	  from	  the	  Book,	  ‘Africa	  is	  only	  an	  
actor,	  the	  punch-­‐bag	  for	  those	  who	  have	  it’	  (Ouattara	  2001b:	  45).	  It	  is	  crucial	  here	  to	  
understand	  that	  Ouattara	  is	  not	  simply	  highlighting	  a	  historical	  event;	  his	  aim	  is	  to	  
expose	  a	  unique	  condition	  that	  precisely	  escapes	  all	  forms	  of	  scientific	  scrutiny.	  He	  is	  
interested	  in	  revealing	  the	  other	  of	  philosophy,	  that	  is,	  the	  other	  of	  what	  escapes	  
writing	  understood	  in	  a	  broad	  sense.7	  Africa	  is	  third,	  not	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  in	  the	  sense	  
of	  third-­‐world,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  what	  escapes	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  West-­‐
East.	  Africa	  is	  effectively	  the	  other	  of	  the	  pair	  same/other.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  palliate	  this	  absence	  and	  lack	  of	  significance,	  science,	  and	  specifically,	  
anthropology	  and	  ethnology	  have	  therefore	  desperately	  attempted	  to	  re-­‐instate	  
Africa	  to	  the	  hegemonic	  narrative	  of	  world	  history,	  thus	  absolving	  forever	  the	  
famous	  Hegelian	  condemnation	  of	  1830	  that	  relinquished	  Africa	  to	  ‘immobile’	  
cultures	  ‘without	  history’.	  The	  aim	  of	  these	  scientific	  inquiries	  is	  always	  the	  same:	  
writing	  where	  there	  is	  no	  writing;	  creating	  systems	  where	  there	  is	  a	  resistance	  to	  all	  
forms	  of	  systematization.8	  By	  reinstating	  Africa	  within	  history,	  the	  call	  of	  these	  
scientific	  inquiries	  has	  therefore	  been	  to	  force	  it	  to	  adopt	  a	  concept,	  to	  make	  it	  enter	  
into	  the	  world	  of	  writing.	  All	  this	  can	  be	  said	  from	  another	  perspective:	  the	  
imposition	  of	  the	  Book	  as	  the	  only	  concept	  available.	  Without	  wanting	  to	  generalize	  
or	  to	  reduce	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Book	  as	  concept	  to	  one	  example,	  it	  is	  difficult	  not	  to	  
mention	  here	  the	  work	  of	  missionaries	  (and	  specifically	  of	  White	  Fathers)	  during	  the	  
colonial	  period,	  and	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  work	  of	  American	  evangelicalism	  today:	  
they	  all	  emphasize	  the	  authority	  of	  this	  one	  book,	  the	  Bible.	  This	  work	  has	  been	  and	  
continues	  to	  be	  that	  of	  coercing	  Africa	  in	  learning	  and	  repeating	  the	  Book,	  thus	  
reinforcing	  the	  idea	  that	  Africa	  is	  in	  need	  of	  concept	  or	  in	  need	  of	  religion	  and	  
through	  it,	  of	  salvation	  and	  atonement.	  	  
	  
By	  highlighting	  the	  absence	  of	  Africa	  in	  the	  play	  West-­‐East	  and	  its	  hegemonic	  world	  
domination,	  Ouattara	  doesn’t	  reinforce,	  once	  again,	  the	  stereotype	  that	  Africa	  is	  
insignificant	  or	  is	  in	  need	  of	  signification.	  As	  he	  says,	  	  
	  
Our	  attempt	  is	  not	  to	  adopt	  the	  position	  of	  the	  one	  who	  has	  no	  history,	  but	  to	  
take	  on	  the	  place	  left	  aside	  in	  this	  history.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  task	  consists	  in	  
thinking	  from	  the	  premise	  of	  what	  escapes	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  concept	  put	  
forward	  by	  writing	  and	  the	  Book.	  (Ouattara	  2001b:	  126)	  	  
	  
In	  doing	  so,	  his	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  reveal	  Africa	  as	  the	  concept	  absence	  or	  as	  the	  society	  of	  
the	  non-­‐concept,	  for	  example.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  then	  Ouattara	  would	  simply	  
reinforce	  once	  again	  hegemonic	  colonial	  and	  global	  narratives.	  Instead,	  Ouattara	  
tries	  to	  think	  Africa	  not	  as	  the	  site	  of	  yet	  another	  philosophy,	  but,	  more	  radically,	  as	  
the	  other	  of	  philosophy	  itself,	  that	  is,	  as	  the	  Other	  of	  the	  concept.	  Africa	  is	  effectively	  
the	  expression	  of	  what	  escapes	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  concept,	  including	  a-­‐
conceptuality	  itself.	  	  
	  
To	  Unhinge,	  Being-­‐Third,	  Authenticity,	  Anticipatory	  Inertia	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  justify	  such	  an	  extraordinary	  claim,	  Ouattara	  adjusts	  four	  existing	  key	  
concepts.	  These	  four	  adjustments	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  Ouattara	  makes	  in	  his	  rich	  
and	  complex	  oeuvre,	  but	  they	  are	  probably	  the	  most	  distinctive	  ones	  in	  what	  
concerns	  us	  here.	  
	  
The	  first	  adjustment	  directly	  refers	  back	  to	  Franz	  Crahay’s	  admonition	  that	  in	  order	  
to	  belong	  to	  the	  world	  and,	  thereby,	  more	  specifically,	  to	  the	  global	  discourse	  of	  
philosophy,	  Africa	  needs	  to	  ‘take	  off’	  (décoller)	  conceptually.	  Against	  this	  idea	  
borrowed	  from	  aeronautics,	  Ouattara	  puts	  forward	  in	  Penser	  l’Afrique	  the	  idea	  that	  
Africa	  needs	  to	  unhinge	  (décrocher)	  itself	  from	  all	  conceptuality	  instead.	  He	  borrows	  
this	  expression	  from	  Habermas:	  Entkoppelung	  (Habermas	  1989:	  170).	  With	  the	  verb	  
‘to	  unhinge’	  Ouattara	  is	  not	  suggesting	  that	  Africa	  should	  refuse	  all	  conceptuality.	  He	  
is	  not	  suggesting	  a	  logical	  inversion	  to	  writing,	  the	  Book,	  or	  the	  concept.	  With	  every	  
unhinging,	  necessarily	  comes	  a	  legitimate	  hinging	  (Rückkoppelung),	  a	  valid	  
attachment	  to	  what	  has	  been	  ‘unhinged’	  so	  to	  speak.	  With	  the	  verb	  ‘to	  unhinge’	  
instead	  of	  ‘to	  take-­‐off,’	  Ouattara	  is	  thereby	  highlighting	  the	  need	  to	  escape	  all	  
ratiocinations	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  philosophizing	  anew,	  to	  restart	  philosophy	  from	  a	  
perspective	  that	  precisely	  evades	  conceptuality.	  To	  unhinge	  is	  to	  open	  up	  a	  new	  
space	  for	  philosophy,	  to	  emphasize	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  what	  has	  not	  yet	  
been	  thought.	  The	  difference	  is	  slight	  but	  immensely	  significant	  because	  with	  
‘unhinging’	  Ouattara	  is	  no	  longer	  emphasizing	  an	  absence	  or	  a	  lack,	  but	  a	  possibility,	  
a	  promise	  pointing	  in	  a	  direction	  outside	  of	  already	  established	  discourses.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  move	  from	  ‘take	  off’	  to	  ‘unhinge’	  is	  intended	  to	  evade	  what	  
Ouattara,	  in	  the	  lineage	  of	  Adorno,	  calls	  the	  coldness	  of	  the	  concept.	  The	  West-­‐East	  
‘conceptual	  order	  is	  cold.	  Its	  sovereign	  coldness	  results	  in	  its	  indifference	  to	  the	  
particular	  or	  the	  singular.	  Coldness	  signifies	  indifference	  ad	  litteram’	  (Ouattara	  
1999b:	  48).	  To	  emphasize	  the	  coldness	  of	  the	  concept	  is	  thereby	  to	  point	  to	  the	  
violence	  of	  the	  process	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  invention	  and	  imposition	  of	  concepts:	  
indifference	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  other	  and	  its	  suffering,	  detachment	  with	  regards	  to	  
the	  injustice	  done	  to	  humanity,	  etc.	  Cold,	  haughty,	  and	  disinterested,	  the	  cognitive	  
process	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  concept	  resembles	  exactly	  the	  process	  of	  colonization.	  The	  
particular	  or	  singular	  is	  instrumentalized,	  used,	  abused,	  and	  above	  all	  homogenized	  
so	  as	  to	  render	  it	  not	  so	  much	  docile,	  but	  ignored	  in	  the	  great	  march	  of	  the	  world’s	  
progress.	  Once	  again,	  with	  this	  remark,	  Ouattara	  is	  not	  suggesting	  a	  reversed	  
position:	  the	  warmth	  of	  intuition	  or	  immediacy	  against	  the	  coldness	  of	  the	  concept.	  
He	  suggests	  instead	  the	  temperature	  at	  which	  the	  concept	  becomes	  dangerous.	  To	  
realize	  its	  coldness	  is	  to	  highlights	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  thereby	  to	  open	  up	  
to	  the	  other,	  the	  particular	  or	  singular	  and	  to	  invite	  thinking	  anew.	  	  
	  
Ouattara’s	  second	  adjustment	  is	  to	  pervert	  and	  rethink	  the	  disused	  expression	  ‘third-­‐
world’.	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  expression	  ‘third-­‐world’	  was	  first	  coined	  by	  Alfred	  
Sauvy,	  a	  French	  demographer,	  anthropologist	  and	  historian,	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  
the	  French	  magazine	  L'Observateur	  on	  14	  August	  1952	  in	  order	  to	  refer	  to	  countries	  
that	  were	  unaligned	  with	  either	  the	  Communist	  Soviet	  bloc	  or	  the	  Capitalist	  NATO	  
bloc	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  His	  usage	  was	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  Third	  Estate,	  the	  
‘proletarian’	  class	  of	  France	  who,	  before	  and	  during	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  opposed	  
the	  nobles	  (First	  Estate)	  and	  clergy	  (Second	  Estate).	  Sauvy	  wrote,	  ‘This	  third	  world	  
ignored,	  exploited,	  despised	  like	  the	  third	  estate	  also	  wants	  to	  be	  something’	  (Sauvy	  
1952:	  14).	  Ouattara	  makes	  no	  specific	  reference	  to	  this	  history	  and	  only	  scant	  
mention	  of	  its	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  context.	  His	  interest	  lies	  instead	  in	  
thinking	  what	  and	  who	  is	  ‘third’	  and	  left	  outside	  of	  all	  conceptuality.	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  
Africa	  is	  the	  being-­‐third	  of	  the	  world	  [‘L’Afrique	  est	  l’être-­‐en-­‐tiers	  du	  monde’]	  
(Ouattara	  2001b	  :	  24);	  it	  is	  what	  does	  not	  count	  in	  the	  relation	  Same/Other,	  
Jew/Greek,	  Occident/Orient,	  West/East.	  	  
	  
What	  is	  most	  interesting	  in	  this	  adjustment	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  exclusively	  philosophical;	  
it	  is	  also	  necessarily	  economic	  because	  there	  can	  be	  no	  concept	  without	  an	  economy	  
of	  the	  concept.	  In	  this	  way,	  Africa,	  as	  being-­‐third,	  is	  what	  falls	  outside	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  
economic	  negotiation,	  not	  only	  the	  pair	  West/East,	  but	  also	  North/South.	  The	  third	  
is	  the	  left	  over,	  or	  what	  is	  left	  aside	  from	  world	  affairs.	  Ouattara’s	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  
reassert	  what	  everyone	  already	  knows	  or	  to	  repeat	  a	  well-­‐worn	  cliché	  about	  poor	  
countries	  and	  their	  lack	  of	  power	  in	  the	  world.	  His	  aim	  is	  to	  rethink	  the	  position	  of	  
being-­‐third	  in	  order	  to	  expose,	  beyond	  philosophy,	  its	  untapped	  economic	  potential.	  
Because	  it	  is	  the	  other	  of	  conceptuality	  and	  therefore	  economy,	  being-­‐third	  is	  
effectively	  what	  structures	  the	  non-­‐economic	  exchange	  between	  humans;	  it	  is	  what	  
gives	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  Same	  and	  the	  Other	  to	  take	  place.	  In	  this	  way,	  being-­‐
third	  does	  not	  reference	  a	  ‘periphery’	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  world	  system	  dominated	  by	  
some	  ‘core’	  countries.	  As	  such,	  it	  cannot	  reference	  a	  geographical	  ‘world,’	  but	  a	  
position,	  what	  allows	  and	  challenges	  economic	  rationality	  and/or	  irrationality	  to	  
unfold.	  
	  
This	  is	  where	  Ouattara	  makes	  perhaps	  the	  most	  surprising	  move.	  In	  order	  to	  justify	  
this	  shift	  from	  third-­‐world	  to	  being-­‐third,	  he	  suggests	  that	  being-­‐third	  operates	  
under	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  economy.	  If	  the	  third-­‐world	  spends	  its	  time	  catching	  up	  with	  
the	  economic	  decisions	  and	  modes	  of	  operations	  of	  the	  first	  and	  second	  worlds,	  
being-­‐third	  operates	  instead	  ‘an	  informal	  economy’	  (Ouattara	  2001b:	  82)	  that	  is,	  a	  
type	  of	  economy	  that	  evades	  all	  forms	  of	  trade	  agreement.	  This	  does	  not	  refer	  a	  kind	  
of	  black	  market	  or	  a	  type	  of	  economy	  that	  evades	  tax,	  government	  regulations	  and	  
leaves	  workers	  without	  legal	  protection	  and	  social	  benefits	  such	  as	  pensions,	  sick	  pay	  
and	  health	  insurance.	  Ouattara’s	  informal	  economy	  is	  on	  the	  contrary	  akin	  to	  
Georges	  Bataille’s	  general	  economy.9	  Although	  Ouattara	  does	  not	  mention	  it	  
specifically,	  the	  similarities	  are	  striking.	  Ouattara’s	  informal	  economy	  is,	  like	  
Bataille’s	  general	  economy,	  what	  does	  not	  generate	  further	  production	  or	  profit	  
while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  giving	  the	  possibility	  for	  economy-­‐as-­‐exchange	  to	  operate	  
(See	  Bataille	  1993).	  With	  this	  surprising	  move,	  Ouattara	  effectively	  calls	  for	  a	  radical	  
rethinking	  of	  the	  tropes	  of	  emancipation	  and	  progress,	  for	  these	  are	  no	  longer	  
situated	  in	  economic	  development,	  but	  in	  a	  type	  of	  authentic	  opening	  onto	  the	  
future	  free	  from	  all	  expectancies	  of	  returns.	  	  
	  
This	  move	  from	  third-­‐world	  to	  being-­‐third	  and	  to	  an	  informal	  economy	  understood	  
as	  non-­‐production	  is	  without	  doubt	  daring.	  So	  the	  question	  can	  only	  be	  asked:	  Is	  this	  
move	  really	  possible?	  In	  order	  to	  perhaps	  make	  sense	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  necessary	  here	  to	  
explore	  a	  third	  adjustment.	  This	  third	  move	  is	  Ouattara’s	  concerted	  effort	  to	  think	  
being-­‐third	  as	  a	  form	  of	  authenticity	  against	  the	  inauthenticity	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  
classic	  reference	  point	  here	  is	  of	  course	  Heidegger’s	  insistence	  on	  radically	  
separating	  ontology	  from	  the	  ontic	  sciences.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Heidegger	  is	  able—or	  at	  
least,	  aspires—to	  lay	  the	  foundations	  of	  an	  authentic	  science	  (ontology)	  that	  will	  
inform	  all	  subsequent	  inauthentic	  ontic	  determinations	  (Heidegger	  1962).	  History,	  
economy,	  anthropology,	  psychology,	  etc.	  are	  therefore	  only	  concerned	  with	  
inauthentic	  specifications	  such	  as,	  for	  example,	  an	  ‘I,’	  a	  self-­‐governing	  ‘subject,’	  an	  
‘ego,’	  a	  ‘community,’	  a	  ‘nation,’	  the	  ‘world,’	  etc.	  Even	  African	  culture	  is	  basically	  
inauthentic,	  because	  however	  it	  is	  formulated,	  it	  always	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  
authenticity	  of	  facticity	  itself.	  The	  only	  authentic	  determination	  is	  therefore	  
ontology,	  namely,	  here	  Dasein.	  	  
	  
Ouattara	  picks	  up	  this	  distinction	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  Africa.	  As	  being-­‐third,	  Africa	  
stands	  for	  the	  authentic	  mode	  of	  being	  in	  comparison	  to	  all	  the	  Same/Other,	  
Greek/Jew,	  Occident/Orient,	  West/East	  inauthentic	  determinations.	  Africa	  embodies	  
‘being-­‐there,	  Dasein’	  (Ouattara	  2001b:	  103),	  that	  is,	  being-­‐third	  against	  the	  great	  
swarm	  of	  inauthentic	  concepts	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  world—including	  all	  colonial	  and	  
post-­‐colonial	  visions	  of	  ‘Africa’.	  As	  such,	  Africa,	  as	  being-­‐third,	  is	  effectively	  what	  
escapes	  reason,	  discourses,	  disciplines,	  institutional	  narratives,	  and	  therefore,	  as	  we	  
have	  seen,	  all	  forms	  of	  tradable	  economies.	  In	  this	  way,	  like	  Dasein,	  Africa	  or	  being-­‐
third	  is	  what	  is	  never	  taken	  in	  consideration;	  what	  is	  always	  already	  forgotten.	  It	  
would	  be	  wrong	  to	  imagine	  this	  extraordinary	  equation	  (Africa	  =	  being-­‐third	  =	  
Dasein)	  as	  if	  to	  indicate	  some	  hierarchy	  of	  values	  between	  a	  supposedly	  authentic	  
Africa	  and	  an	  inauthentic	  world.	  The	  crucial	  move	  here	  is	  that	  Africa,	  being	  resistant	  
to	  the	  concept,	  can	  only	  ‘let	  be’	  of	  the	  concept.	  This	  ‘letting	  be’—another	  crucial	  
non-­‐concept	  borrowed	  from	  Heidegger—indicates	  not	  the	  act	  of	  ruthlessly	  
transforming	  the	  other	  into	  a	  concept	  or	  an	  object	  of	  knowledge	  and	  thereby	  making	  
them	  the	  victim	  of	  our	  objectifying	  reason,	  but	  the	  act	  of	  thinking	  the	  other	  as	  other,	  
to	  think	  them	  not	  like	  ‘us,’	  but	  as	  ‘other’.	  The	  lesson	  of	  Africa	  to	  the	  world	  is	  a	  mode	  
of	  being	  that	  ‘lets	  be’	  of	  the	  concept,	  opens	  up	  to	  the	  other	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  remains	  
authentic;	  an	  authenticity	  that	  crucially	  suffers	  absolutely	  no	  cultural	  con-­‐figuration.	  
	  
This	  leads	  me	  to	  Ouattara’s	  fourth	  crucial	  adjustment.	  In	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  way	  
Africa	  operates	  and	  in	  order	  to	  make	  ‘it’	  stand	  out	  as	  a	  comprehensible	  ontological	  
determination	  that	  ‘lets-­‐be’	  of	  all	  concepts,	  Ouattara	  needs	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  way	  
of	  qualifying	  this	  opening	  onto	  the	  other,	  this	  ‘letting-­‐be’	  of	  the	  concept	  without	  re-­‐
absorbing	  it	  again	  in	  a	  conceptual	  category.	  He	  calls	  the	  mode	  of	  operation	  that	  
distinguishes	  Africa	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  an	  ‘anticipatory	  inertia’	  (Ouattara	  
2001b:	  45).	  This	  expression	  could	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  Ouattara	  is	  yet	  again	  
reinforcing	  the	  clichés:	  an	  inertia	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  typical	  intellectual	  lethargy,	  a	  
weakness	  of	  spirit,	  an	  aversion	  towards	  reason,	  or,	  even	  worse,	  an	  incapacity	  to	  
think,	  the	  hallmark	  of	  inferior	  societies.	  Nothing	  is	  further	  from	  what	  Ouattara	  is	  
trying	  to	  do.	  For	  him,	  the	  crucial	  thing	  is	  not	  to	  confuse	  this	  being-­‐third	  with	  an	  
object	  of	  study,	  but	  to	  think	  it	  as	  it	  happens,	  as	  an	  event	  irreducible	  to	  any	  form	  of	  
category.	  An	  anticipatory	  inertia	  is	  therefore	  what	  opens	  itself	  to	  a	  future	  not	  
already	  conceived	  and	  calculated,	  predetermined	  and	  programmable.	  Africa	  as	  
being-­‐third	  is	  what	  does	  not	  project,	  plan,	  or	  attack.	  It	  is	  what	  awaits	  no	  predictive	  
confirmation	  of	  the	  concept,	  that	  is,	  no	  more	  return	  to	  and	  of	  the	  same.	  Africa	  is	  
structured	  by	  an	  inertia	  because	  it	  is	  the	  other	  of	  all	  accountability,	  what	  precisely	  
undermines	  the	  techno-­‐centric	  modernity	  that	  marks	  our	  world’s	  destiny.	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  moving	  passage	  in	  Ouattara’s	  novel	  Le	  Cimetière	  sénégalais,	  that	  
illustrates	  this	  anticipatory	  inertia.	  After	  realizing	  the	  lack	  of	  importance	  France	  
assigns	  to	  Senegalese	  men	  who	  died	  fighting	  Nazism	  in	  Europe,	  the	  hero,	  Djibril,	  
suddenly	  exclaims	  that	  he	  and	  his	  fellow	  countrymen	  belong	  in	  fact	  to	  a	  history	  of	  
anomalies,	  to	  a	  chronicle	  of	  failures	  that	  accounts	  for	  nothing.	  Ouattara	  then	  writes:	  	  
	  
He	  then	  realized	  that	  he	  himself	  was	  a	  mistake,	  a	  failure	  incapable	  of	  either	  
experiencing	  defeat	  or	  proving	  that	  he	  had	  been,	  was	  still,	  and	  will	  always	  remain	  
a	  victim.	  The	  cemetery	  was	  the	  amphitheater	  of	  his	  lament,	  without	  hope	  or	  
salvation.	  Of	  this	  sad	  soliloquy,	  he	  retained	  the	  idea	  that	  both	  defeat	  and	  victory	  
imply	  or	  presuppose	  a	  conceptual	  structure	  and	  a	  cast	  of	  mind	  that	  weren’t	  his.	  
(Ouattara	  2006:	  115)	  
	  
This	  is	  not	  an	  ordinary	  lament;	  this	  is	  the	  realization	  that	  war	  reveals	  what	  it	  means	  
to	  ‘be-­‐third’:	  it	  can	  be	  neither	  victorious	  nor	  defeated	  because	  these	  are	  the	  
hallmarks	  of	  a	  world	  ruled	  by	  concepts.	  Djibril,	  and	  by	  extension	  Africa,	  can	  only	  
remain	  without	  hope	  or	  salvation,	  an	  anticipatory	  inertia	  that	  cannot	  project	  onto	  
the	  future	  because	  it	  has	  no	  past,	  no	  concept	  to	  inherit,	  fight	  for,	  and	  pass	  along.	  	  
	  
Once	  again,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  Ouattara	  thinks	  Africa	  has	  no	  culture	  or	  heritage	  
or	  that	  the	  world	  does	  not	  recognize	  Africa’s	  place	  in	  history.	  Ouattara’s	  aim	  is	  to	  
expose	  the	  crucial	  political	  role	  that	  Africa	  can	  take	  if	  it	  realizes	  its	  ‘being-­‐thirdness’.	  
An	  anticipatory	  inertia	  is	  not	  a	  passive	  waiting	  for	  the	  world	  to	  take	  place.	  Ouattara	  
does	  not	  advocate,	  ‘to	  hang	  around’	  and	  wait	  until	  something	  happens.	  With	  
expressions	  such	  as	  ‘without	  hope	  or	  salvation,’	  the	  idea	  is	  for	  being-­‐third	  to	  elude	  
all	  projections,	  anticipated	  victories	  and	  defeats.	  The	  aim	  for	  Africa	  is	  thereby	  not	  to	  
imitate,	  parody,	  or	  parrot	  the	  West/East	  in	  its	  frantic	  race	  for	  better	  profit-­‐margins,	  
bigger	  victories	  or	  crashing	  defeats,	  but	  to	  refrain	  from	  being	  ‘in	  need	  of	  
development’	  (Ouattara	  2001b:	  107-­‐8)	  in	  order	  to	  invent	  itself	  otherwise.	  
Development	  is	  precisely	  the	  hallmark	  of	  inauthenticity,	  the	  playground	  for	  the	  
concept,	  the	  ‘structure	  and	  cast	  of	  mind’	  that	  predicts,	  projects,	  and	  calculates	  in	  the	  
hope	  of	  a	  glorious	  future,	  the	  ultimate	  achievement	  of	  the	  concept.	  By	  stressing	  the	  
importance	  of	  this	  ‘anticipatory	  inertia,’	  Ouattara	  points	  the	  way	  to	  a	  new	  future	  for	  
Africa,	  one	  finally	  free	  of	  the	  shackles	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  its	  accountability.	  
	  
Proposals:	  Noise,	  Fragments,	  Ethno-­‐Thought	  
	  
Now	  that	  we	  have	  exposed	  Ouattara’s	  four	  adjustments,	  what	  is	  he	  proposing	  to	  do	  
with	  them?	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  conceive	  a	  new	  and	  unexpected	  non-­‐
conceptual	  structure	  for	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa;	  it	  is	  another	  to	  envisage	  it	  as	  a	  political	  
strategy,	  especially	  one	  that	  has	  the	  ambition	  of	  evading	  all	  economic	  and	  political	  
conceptuality.	  Amongst	  the	  wealth	  of	  ideas,	  thoughts,	  and	  images	  contained	  in	  his	  
work,	  Ouattara	  appears	  to	  put	  forward	  three	  key	  proposals:	  noise,	  fragment,	  ethno-­‐
thought.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  proposal	  refers	  to	  ‘noise’	  and,	  although	  Ouattara	  only	  mentions	  it	  briefly	  in	  
Penser	  l’Afrique,	  it	  is	  a	  crucial	  reference	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  better	  grasp	  of	  what	  
this	  being-­‐third	  could	  actually	  do	  in	  this	  world	  awash	  with	  concepts,	  calculations,	  
projections,	  and	  programmatic	  returns.	  We	  already	  noted	  that	  being-­‐third	  operates	  
away	  from	  writing,	  the	  Book,	  its	  corollary,	  the	  concept,	  and	  the	  dialectic	  model	  
Same/Other,	  Greek/Jew,	  Occident/Orient,	  West/East	  and	  that	  such	  an	  operation	  
exposes	  the	  world	  not	  as	  antagonistic	  or	  agonistic,	  but	  as	  essentially	  and	  always	  
already	  triadic.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  dialectic	  model	  necessarily	  operates	  against	  a	  
third-­‐party	  (being-­‐third)	  that	  serves	  as	  the	  backdrop	  to	  the	  battle	  of	  concepts.	  Aware	  
of	  this,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  play	  Same/Other	  is	  thereby	  to	  eliminate	  this	  background,	  to	  
erase	  what	  resists	  the	  concept,	  this	  unbearable	  noise	  that	  distorts	  and	  spoils	  the	  
confident	  march	  of	  progress.	  To	  write,	  for	  example,	  is	  to	  eliminate	  noise,	  to	  turn	  
cacophony	  into	  a	  symphony	  of	  meaning	  (from	  sumphōnos	  ‘harmonious,’	  from	  sun-­‐	  
‘together’	  +	  phōnē	  ‘sound’).	  Instead	  of	  simply	  being	  a	  loud	  and	  confused	  set	  of	  
sounds,	  noise	  has	  therefore	  a	  crucial	  role	  to	  play.	  How	  does	  Ouattara	  use	  it	  to	  
explicate	  the	  noisy	  ‘doing’	  of	  this	  being-­‐third?	  
	  
Ouattara	  refers	  to	  the	  sociologist	  Niklas	  Luhmann	  and	  to	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
notion	  of	  noise	  (Luhmann	  1996,	  83).10	  Instead	  of	  seeing	  noise	  as	  a	  disturbance	  to	  the	  
good	  conduct	  of	  rational	  discourse,	  Luhmann	  sees	  it	  instead	  as	  what	  precisely	  stops	  
the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  Same/Other.	  Noise	  disturbs	  the	  dialogical	  system,	  increases	  the	  
uncertainty	  of	  what	  is	  being	  stated,	  announced,	  projected,	  and	  planned.	  Putting	  
together	  an	  issue	  on	  Francophone	  African	  Philosophy,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  way	  of	  
reducing	  the	  noise	  of	  conflicting	  information	  of	  a	  large	  section	  of	  an	  entire	  continent	  
in	  order	  to	  channel	  them	  into	  a	  set	  of	  cohesive	  discourses,	  examples	  of	  order,	  the	  
triumph	  of	  the	  concept.	  Noise	  therefore	  stands	  for	  the	  accidental	  or	  the	  undesirable	  
amongst	  the	  planned	  order	  of	  a	  project.	  The	  difficulty	  with	  this	  thought	  is	  to	  never	  
conceive	  noise	  as	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  any	  concept,	  but	  to	  retain	  it	  for	  its	  
disruptive	  qualities.	  Noise,	  for	  Luhmann,	  must	  retain	  its	  essential	  potential:	  the	  
possibility	  of	  scrambling	  codes	  so	  as	  to	  set	  them	  in	  motion	  along	  new	  evolutionary	  
lines	  of	  flight.	  As	  such,	  noise	  is	  an	  essential	  political	  gesture	  that,	  significantly,	  always	  
comes	  up	  during	  street	  demonstrations.	  	  
	  
With	  this	  Luhmannian	  reference,	  Ouattara	  transforms	  his	  being-­‐third	  into	  a	  political	  
tool.	  Africa	  then	  ceases	  to	  be	  simply	  resistant	  to	  the	  concept,	  refusing	  to	  take	  off,	  
remaining	  stubbornly	  ante-­‐conceptual,	  frustratingly	  ontological	  and	  authentic	  to	  
become	  thanks	  to	  its	  anticipatory	  inertia,	  the	  political	  disruption	  of	  the	  world.	  Africa	  
as	  being-­‐third	  stands	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  noise	  that	  never	  becomes	  a	  ‘voice,’	  that	  is,	  an	  
agency	  by	  which	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  view	  is	  expressed	  or	  represented.	  Africa’s	  
informal	  economy	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  this	  noise:	  anyone	  can	  gain	  entry	  or	  exit	  it;	  no	  
skills	  are	  necessary	  to	  operate	  within	  it;	  no	  accounting	  and	  no	  reporting	  takes	  place,	  
and	  above	  all,	  no	  submission	  to	  governing	  bodies	  is	  called	  for.	  This	  noise	  is	  not	  a	  
temporary	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  inevitable	  march	  towards	  formal	  economic	  systems.	  
What	  is	  at	  stake	  here	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  heterogeneity	  that	  refuses	  to	  be	  
absorbed;	  that	  resists	  any	  form	  of	  homogenization.	  In	  this	  way,	  far	  from	  seeing	  an	  
informal	  economy	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  a	  world	  forever	  hungry	  for	  repressive	  systems	  of	  
representations	  and	  control,	  Africa’s	  noise	  is	  a	  force	  against	  political,	  economic,	  and	  
cultural	  hegemonies.	  It	  is	  the	  other	  of	  a	  dissenting	  voice;	  it	  is	  what	  disarms	  opinions	  
and	  attitudes.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  proposal	  is	  formal	  and	  complements	  noise:	  it	  concerns	  the	  formalization	  
of	  the	  idea	  of	  being-­‐third.	  One	  objection	  against	  Ouattara	  could	  be	  that	  he	  does	  
nothing	  else	  but	  oppose	  one	  concept	  against	  another:	  being-­‐third	  as	  opposed	  to	  
being	  one/two,	  the	  authentic	  against	  the	  inauthentic,	  the	  ante-­‐conceptual	  against	  
both	  the	  conceptual	  and	  the	  a-­‐conceptual,	  and	  an	  anticipatory	  inertia	  against	  future-­‐
orientated	  economies	  of	  return.	  In	  the	  end,	  Being-­‐Third	  is	  basically	  yet	  another	  
western	  inauthentic	  concept,	  borrowed	  from	  Greek	  philosophy,	  and	  thereby	  totally	  
alien	  to	  Africa.	  This	  means	  that,	  ultimately,	  Ouattara’s	  thesis	  remains	  just	  that,	  a	  
thesis	  with	  a	  central	  concept.	  His	  book,	  Penser	  l’Afrique	  remains	  yet	  another	  book,	  
another	  extension	  of	  the	  Book	  as	  inherited	  by	  the	  pair	  Greek/Jew	  or	  West/East.	  In	  
this	  way,	  Ouattara’s	  work	  only	  operates	  within	  an	  economic	  system	  called	  western	  
academia,	  for	  which	  new	  concepts	  always	  need	  to	  be	  invented,	  discussed,	  traded,	  
and	  ultimately	  discarded.	  And	  to	  make	  matters	  worse,	  Ouattara	  doesn’t	  unhinge	  
Africa;	  he	  simply	  repeats	  Crahay’s	  admonition	  that	  Africa	  indeed	  needs	  to	  ‘take-­‐off’.	  
	  
This	  problem	  is	  particularly	  salient	  if	  one	  considers	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  Ouattara	  himself	  
says,	  ‘Black	  Africa	  is	  contemporary	  with	  western	  modernity’	  (Ouattara	  2001:	  72).	  This	  
basically	  implies	  that	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  as	  an	  overall	  entity,	  and	  thereby,	  to	  follow	  
his	  vocabulary,	  as	  being-­‐third,	  only	  really	  appeared	  with	  colonization,	  that	  is,	  once	  
European	  countries	  began	  to	  conceive	  the	  second-­‐half	  of	  the	  continent	  as	  a	  single	  
autonomous	  entity	  in	  need	  of	  a	  concept,	  in	  need	  of	  writing.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  
would	  have	  been	  no	  being-­‐third	  if	  the	  pairs	  West/East,	  Occident/Orient	  had	  not	  
attained	  the	  stage	  of	  being	  ruled	  by	  the	  concept	  and	  of	  wanting	  to	  impose	  it	  onto	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  Such	  simultaneity	  can	  only	  thereby	  reabsorb	  being-­‐third	  as	  yet	  
another	  western	  concept,	  yet	  another	  conceptualization	  of	  Africa	  that	  is	  utterly	  alien	  
to	  the	  people	  and	  customs	  that	  inhabit	  it.	  Ultimately,	  with	  being-­‐third,	  Ouattara	  
does	  nothing	  else	  but	  reinforce	  both	  the	  cliché	  image	  of	  Africa	  as	  a	  site	  of	  chaos	  
without	  future	  and,	  more	  problematically,	  the	  very	  ideology	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  avoid.	  
	  
Ouattara	  is	  eminently	  aware	  of	  this	  problem	  and	  in	  order	  to	  palliate	  it,	  he	  articulates	  
his	  idea	  in	  a	  way	  that	  prevents	  him	  from	  being	  caught	  up	  in	  yet	  another	  
philosophical	  conundrum.	  In	  Penser	  l’Afrique,	  his	  articulation	  takes	  the	  shape	  of	  both	  
a	  thesis	  and	  a	  series	  of	  fragments	  added	  as	  appendix	  to	  the	  thesis.	  The	  fragments	  
are	  twenty-­‐seven	  in	  number	  and	  are	  made	  up	  of	  either	  one	  sentence	  or	  an	  entire	  
paragraph.	  To	  justify	  this	  double	  output,	  he	  writes:	  	  
	  
Being-­‐third’s	  nearly	  obsessive	  […]	  resistance	  to	  systems	  and	  thereby	  to	  Hegel’s	  
rationalization	  of	  the	  real,	  calls	  for	  another	  type	  of	  writing—hence	  this	  second	  
part.	  Alien	  to	  systematization,	  this	  being-­‐third	  can	  be	  conceived	  as	  fragment	  […]	  
The	  fragment	  originates	  in	  the	  system	  not	  unlike	  freedom	  in	  relation	  to	  slavery	  or	  
autonomy	  in	  relation	  to	  heterogeneity.	  Fragmentary	  writing	  is	  thereby	  necessary	  
for	  this	  type	  of	  contestation.	  (Ouattara	  2001b:	  143)	  	  
	  
In	  this	  way,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  truthful	  to	  its	  very	  advent,	  this	  being-­‐third	  can	  only	  
express	  itself	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  evades	  thesis	  and	  grand	  narratives	  with	  one	  central	  
concept	  and	  becomes	  thereby	  utterly	  resilient	  to	  all	  ontical	  discourses.	  There	  is	  
something	  eminently	  clever	  about	  this	  double-­‐move	  (thesis/fragments)	  because	  it	  
prevents	  the	  idea	  of	  seeing	  this	  being-­‐third	  short-­‐circuiting	  itself,	  thus	  reinforcing	  its	  
resistance	  to	  both	  philosophical	  and	  political	  analysis.	  
	  
However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  not	  to	  link	  Ouattara’s	  fragmentary	  writing	  with	  African	  orality,	  
this	  compendium	  of	  sayings,	  parables,	  fables,	  and	  above	  all	  proverbs,	  many	  of	  which	  
are	  now,	  significantly	  transcribed	  into	  writing	  and	  analyzed	  in	  detail.11	  Ouattara	  
neither	  recalls	  nor	  references	  this	  orality,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  reference	  Nietzsche,	  
Musil,	  and,	  of	  course,	  the	  German	  Romantics.	  The	  question	  here	  is	  therefore	  this:	  
while	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  a	  fragmentary	  writing	  can	  provoke	  a	  new	  departure	  in	  
thought,	  how	  does	  it	  produce	  a	  political	  strategy	  that	  aims	  to	  destabilize	  the	  
hegemony	  of	  the	  western	  concept?	  Weren’t	  the	  Schlegel	  brothers,	  Schelling,	  and	  
Novalis	  eminently	  aware	  that	  fragments	  and	  ruins	  aren’t	  enough	  to	  counteract	  the	  
systematic	  march	  of	  the	  Enlightenment?	  This	  set	  of	  questions	  is	  not	  intended	  as	  a	  
criticism	  of	  Ouattara’s	  effort,	  only	  to	  highlight	  the	  difficulty	  of	  what	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  do	  
with	  this	  being-­‐third:	  attempting	  to	  express	  an	  authenticity	  that	  is	  utterly	  resistant	  to	  
any	  form	  of	  conceptual	  totalization—including	  that	  of	  ‘authenticity’	  itself.	  Arguably,	  
such	  authentic	  resistance	  was	  already	  at	  work	  with	  orality.	  Unfortunately,	  as	  is	  well	  
known,	  the	  tyranny	  of	  colonization	  and	  now	  globalization	  eradicated	  it	  for	  being	  too	  
alien	  and	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  conceptualization	  and	  systematization.	  So	  the	  question	  
remains:	  Can	  Ouattara’s	  being-­‐third	  succeed	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Jena	  poets	  
against	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  after	  orality’s	  gradual	  retreat	  in	  
front	  of	  writing,	  the	  concept,	  and	  the	  Book?	  
	  
Perhaps	  one	  way	  to	  evaluate	  the	  success	  of	  Ouattara’s	  attempt	  is	  to	  think	  through	  
his	  third	  proposal:	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  ethno-­‐thought	  in	  lieu	  of	  an	  ethno-­‐philosophy.	  
The	  shift	  between	  philosophy	  and	  thought	  is	  clear	  enough:	  philosophy	  is	  the	  creation	  
of	  concept;	  thought,	  by	  contrast,	  occurs	  prior	  to	  conceptualization,	  in	  the	  co-­‐
incidence	  of	  authentic	  being.	  In	  order	  to	  expose	  this	  type	  of	  thought,	  Ouattara	  
focuses	  on	  the	  way	  space	  and	  time	  are	  articulated	  in	  both	  pre-­‐colonial	  times	  and—
extraordinarily—in	  Heidegger’s	  late	  work	  (especially	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  
fourfold).12	  For	  both	  pre-­‐colonial	  Africa	  and	  the	  late	  Heidegger,	  space	  and	  time	  can	  
be	  apprehended	  neither	  from	  a	  set	  of	  measurements	  nor	  from	  a	  monad	  or	  now-­‐
point	  at	  its	  origin.	  Space	  and	  time	  are	  apprehended	  and	  articulated	  as	  clearing,	  that	  
is,	  from	  the	  way	  being-­‐third	  proceeds	  by	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  self-­‐determinations,	  
clearing	  its	  own	  space	  and	  time	  as	  space	  and	  time.	  Since	  being-­‐third	  and	  thought	  
occurs	  in	  the	  same	  non-­‐coincidence,	  then	  thought	  and	  clearing	  cannot	  be	  
distinguished	  from	  one	  another.	  And	  since	  thought	  is	  not	  concept,	  but	  noise	  and	  
fragmentation,	  then	  these	  can	  only	  be	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  being-­‐third	  who	  both	  
inhabits	  and	  makes	  space	  and	  time;	  the	  expression	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  free	  from	  any	  
‘metric	  ordination	  of	  place	  or	  measurement’	  (Ouattara	  2000:	  89-­‐90).	  Such	  a	  daring	  
juxtaposition	  (pre-­‐colonial	  times/late	  Heidegger),	  allows	  him	  to	  devise	  a	  type	  of	  
thought	  that	  is	  both	  truthful	  to	  authentic	  being	  and	  free	  of	  (measured)	  concepts,	  
thus	  signing	  the	  ends	  of	  both	  Greek	  and	  ethno-­‐philosophy.	  	  
	  
But	  what	  is	  one	  to	  make	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  retaining	  an	  ‘ethno’?	  When	  the	  expression	  
ethno-­‐philosophy	  was	  first	  coined,	  the	  idea	  referred	  to	  a	  type	  of	  philosophy	  based	  
on	  data	  collected	  through	  ethnographical	  and	  linguistic	  inquiry.	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  
works	  of	  Tempels	  and	  Kagame	  are	  often	  cited	  as	  archetypal	  of	  this	  philosophical	  
method.	  Two	  of	  the	  countless	  criticisms	  levelled	  against	  this	  type	  of	  philosophy	  are	  
that	  it	  falls	  for	  the	  myth	  that	  Africa	  always	  had	  a	  philosophy	  (in	  the	  Greek	  sense	  of	  
the	  term)	  and	  that	  it	  pretends	  to	  bring	  together	  all	  the	  members	  of	  a	  community	  in	  
one	  universal	  language.	  Can	  the	  same	  be	  said	  of	  Ouattara’s	  ethno-­‐thought?	  The	  shift	  
from	  ethno-­‐philosophy	  to	  ethno-­‐thought	  allows	  Ouattara	  to	  evade	  both	  criticisms:	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  co-­‐incidence	  of	  thought	  and	  authentic	  being	  cannot	  reference	  
any	  geographical	  or	  historical	  delimitation	  such	  as	  Africa.	  Paradoxically,	  this	  does	  not	  
make	  it	  less	  African	  because	  only	  a	  being-­‐third	  can	  express	  it.	  An	  ethno-­‐thought	  is	  
indeed	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  disenfranchised,	  of	  the	  one	  allergic	  to	  or	  alienated	  from	  
the	  concept.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  co-­‐incidence	  of	  thought	  and	  authentic	  being	  
cannot	  generate	  a	  universal	  language	  simply	  because	  such	  a	  thought	  can	  only	  stem	  
from	  a	  particularity	  or	  singularity.	  If	  space	  and	  time	  are	  apprehended	  authentically,	  
that	  is,	  from	  the	  particularity	  or	  singularity	  of	  someone’s	  ethnos—i.e.	  not	  someone’s	  
family,	  tribe,	  nation,	  or	  racial	  affiliation,	  but	  the	  community	  that	  together	  articulates	  
its	  very	  own	  epochal	  clearing—then	  its	  expression	  (noise/fragment)	  can	  become	  
neither	  universal	  nor	  global	  (see	  Ouattara	  2000:	  89-­‐90).	  
	  
The	  move	  from	  ethno-­‐philosophy	  to	  ethno-­‐thought	  clearly	  gives	  a	  new	  impetus	  not	  
only	  to	  African	  thought,	  but	  also	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  thought	  that	  finds	  itself	  on	  the	  
margins	  of	  the	  concept,	  that	  is,	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  frenzied	  and	  unruly	  march	  of	  
rationalization	  imposed	  by	  the	  pairs	  Greek/Jew	  or	  West/East.	  Ultimately,	  an	  ethno-­‐
thought	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  how	  someone	  can	  produce	  themselves	  authentically	  
as	  work-­‐subject.	  The	  noise/fragmentary	  rebellion	  against	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  
concept	  is	  thereby	  an	  exigency	  of	  authentic	  auto-­‐production,	  that	  is,	  of	  invention	  of	  
the	  self	  as	  organon	  free	  of	  any	  totalization	  or	  completion	  and	  therefore	  free	  of	  the	  
enslavement	  imposed	  by	  global	  homogenized	  concepts.	  With	  Ouattara,	  philosophy	  
becomes	  singular	  auto-­‐poiesis,	  self-­‐production,	  self-­‐engendering.	  There	  is	  nothing	  
hyperbolic	  or	  romantic	  and	  idealistic	  about	  this.	  The	  noise/fragmentary	  exigency	  
marshaled	  by	  being-­‐third	  is	  eminently	  concrete	  and	  political:	  it	  calls	  for	  a	  dramatic	  
shift	  in	  thought,	  the	  marshaling	  of	  a	  radically	  different	  kind	  of	  economy,	  the	  
production	  of	  a	  thoroughly	  new	  type	  of	  subjectivity,	  finally	  free	  from	  all	  ontical	  
determinations,	  that	  is,	  free	  from	  all	  historical	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  imposition.	  	  
	  
Auto-­‐Poiesis,	  Unworking,	  and	  Equivocity	  
	  
Can	  ethno-­‐thought	  have	  a	  future?	  If	  one	  expands	  a	  little	  the	  problematic,	  then	  the	  
potential	  of	  these	  proposals	  suddenly	  reveal	  themselves.	  Slavery,	  for	  example,	  was	  
no	  doubt	  abolished	  throughout	  the	  British	  Empire	  in	  1833	  and	  in	  the	  US	  in	  1865,	  but	  
slavery	  to	  the	  structures	  that	  led	  to	  its	  foundations	  remains	  firmly	  in	  place.	  We	  still	  
abide	  to	  fixed	  structures	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  identity	  and	  their	  trade;	  we	  still	  observe	  
strict	  social	  stratifications,	  markers,	  this	  time,	  not	  of	  heritage,	  but	  of	  merit	  and	  
progress;	  we	  still	  have	  faith	  in	  objective	  measures	  of	  social	  class	  and	  position,	  their	  
points	  of	  entry	  and	  exclusion,	  and	  finally,	  but	  most	  importantly,	  we	  respect	  historical	  
lineages	  and	  geographical	  attachments	  and	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  anyone	  who	  does	  
not	  belong	  to	  these	  delimitations.	  Overall,	  we	  still	  abide	  to	  all	  the	  structures	  that	  
help	  identify	  hierarchies	  of	  power,	  however	  much	  we	  claim	  for	  equality	  and	  
freedom.	  Ouattara	  simply,	  but	  most	  forcefully,	  asks	  us	  to	  unchain	  ourselves	  from	  
them,	  not	  in	  an	  anarchic	  way,	  calling	  for	  the	  end	  of	  all	  orders,	  for	  example,	  but	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  fundamentally	  shakes	  all	  the	  structures	  and	  codes	  we	  comply	  with.	  A	  
daring	  move,	  but	  also	  the	  most	  challenging	  of	  calls.	  	  
	  
And	  yet,	  it	  is	  difficult	  not	  to	  foresee	  a	  few	  problems	  with	  such	  a	  formidable	  
challenge.	  The	  first	  one	  can	  be	  stated	  simply:	  can	  an	  authentic	  being-­‐third	  really	  
express	  itself	  in	  noise	  and	  fragments	  without	  at	  the	  same	  time	  re-­‐inscribing	  him	  or	  
herself	  as	  the	  same,	  with	  a	  specific	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  political	  identity?	  In	  other	  
words,	  can	  authenticity	  really	  take	  place	  without	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  inauthenticity	  
of	  the	  concept?	  As	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  and	  Philippe	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  have	  amply	  
demonstrated	  the	  ‘Witz	  continually	  errs	  and	  even	  operates	  between	  system	  and	  
chaos,	  between	  the	  two	  poles	  of	  the	  organon’	  (Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  1988:	  122).	  As	  such,	  
there	  cannot	  be	  a	  pure,	  authentic,	  and	  singular	  auto-­‐poiesis	  without	  system,	  without	  
rationalization,	  one	  which	  invariably	  reinforces	  the	  same	  with	  the	  same	  and	  in	  the	  
process,	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  sovereign	  subject,	  ready	  to	  dominate	  and	  enslave	  
the	  other,	  the	  poor,	  the	  marginal.	  If	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  case,	  then	  Africa	  cannot	  do	  
without	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  pairs	  Greek/Jew	  or	  West/East	  and	  its	  stockpile	  of	  
concepts,	  ratiocinations,	  and	  economic	  deals.	  Africa	  can	  only	  continue,	  like	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  world,	  to	  err	  between	  chaos	  and	  system,	  noise	  and	  dis/harmony,	  fragments	  
and	  thesis,	  in	  other	  words,	  between	  authenticity	  and	  inauthenticity.	  The	  question	  is	  
not	  whether	  ethno-­‐thought	  can	  ‘let-­‐be’	  of	  the	  concept,	  but	  whether	  Greek-­‐
philosophy	  and	  ethno-­‐thought	  work	  together	  in	  the	  making	  not	  of	  Africa,	  but	  of	  a	  
global	  self.	  Are	  we	  not	  all	  being-­‐thirds	  as	  well	  as	  egos	  and	  subjects?	  
	  
The	  second	  problem	  is	  more	  delicate.	  If	  there	  can	  indeed	  be	  an	  Africa	  that	  turns	  its	  
own	  alienation	  into	  a	  political	  gesture	  aiming	  at	  destabilizing	  the	  concept	  and	  in	  the	  
process	  the	  hegemonies	  of	  postcolonialism	  and	  globalization,	  how	  should	  it	  then	  
manifest	  itself?	  An	  unhinged	  authentic	  being	  or	  being-­‐third	  that	  only	  expresses	  itself	  
in	  noise	  and	  fragments,	  that	  operates	  exclusively	  with	  a	  type	  of	  informal	  economy,	  
cannot	  call	  ‘whatever	  it	  produces,’	  a	  work,	  an	  oeuvre,	  or	  a	  contribution	  to	  humanity.	  
If	  it	  is	  true	  to	  its	  form,	  noise	  can	  only	  remain	  noise,	  fragments	  can	  never	  unite	  to	  
form	  a	  cohesive	  discourse.	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  only	  work	  or	  oeuvre	  that	  a	  being-­‐
third	  can	  undertake	  is,	  as	  Maurice	  Blanchot	  rightly	  remarked,	  one	  of	  ‘unworking’	  
[désoeuvrement]	  (Blanchot	  1993:	  357).	  Unworking	  is	  not	  just	  undoing;	  it	  is	  effectively	  
nothing:	  the	  unhinging	  of	  the	  concept,	  the	  interruption	  of	  the	  system,	  the	  disruption	  
of	  the	  code,	  the	  suspension	  of	  discourse.	  To	  go	  back	  to	  a	  vocabulary	  used	  earlier,	  
isn’t	  ‘letting-­‐be’	  precisely	  the	  act	  of	  avoiding	  imposing	  onto	  others	  our	  own	  
projections	  of	  them	  and	  isn’t	  such	  avoidance	  precisely	  doing	  nothing?	  In	  other	  
words,	  can	  one	  think	  the	  other	  as	  other,	  i.e.	  not	  like	  ‘us,’	  but	  really	  as	  ‘other,’	  not	  
thinking	  at	  all?	  Wasn’t	  this	  precisely	  the	  point	  of	  the	  Witz,	  something	  
inconsequential	  that	  produces	  nothing	  more	  than	  its	  own	  absence?	  Can	  Africa,	  this	  
being-­‐third	  really	  claim,	  let	  alone	  take	  on	  this	  unworking?	  And	  more	  importantly,	  can	  
the	  world	  really	  pause	  for	  a	  moment	  (or	  forever)	  the	  frenzied	  marshaling	  of	  concepts	  
and	  systems?	  What	  would	  this	  unworking	  really	  bring	  us?	  
	  
So	  my	  original	  question	  remains:	  Can	  Ouattara’s	  being-­‐third	  really	  succeed	  after	  Jena	  
and	  the	  slow	  death	  of	  orality?	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  question	  of	  success	  or	  failure.	  
The	  efforts	  to	  stop	  the	  concept	  and	  everything	  that	  comes	  in	  its	  wake	  (slavery,	  
colonialism,	  postcolonialsm,	  globalization,	  etc)	  have	  been	  numerous.	  To	  reiterate	  
this	  effort	  by	  recalling	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  authentic	  as	  well	  as	  inauthentic,	  that	  our	  
being-­‐third	  is	  also	  a	  potentiality	  that	  not	  only	  resists	  all	  forms	  of	  domination	  and	  
hegemony,	  but	  also	  offers	  new	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  ourselves	  and	  our	  position	  in	  
the	  world	  can	  only	  be	  a	  good	  thing.	  Over	  and	  beyond	  all	  the	  demands	  that	  are	  
imposed	  onto	  us,	  we	  remain	  an	  auto-­‐production	  or	  more	  precisely,	  an	  auto-­‐
manifestation	  that	  unworks	  itself	  as	  it	  manifest	  itself.	  This	  is	  not	  something	  that	  
philosophy	  or	  any	  other	  ontic	  science	  (from	  the	  West	  or	  the	  East)	  can	  confer	  
meaning	  to,	  let	  alone	  conceptualize.	  Only	  noise,	  fragment,	  or	  orality	  can	  indeed	  
formalize	  it.	  If	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  is	  indeed	  the	  site	  that	  reminds	  us	  of	  this,	  then	  
Ouattara’s	  work	  has	  achieved	  its	  goal.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  of	  ourselves	  and	  of	  others	  
not	  only	  at	  the	  closure	  of	  Greek	  philosophy	  and	  ethno-­‐thought,	  but	  also	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  both	  systems	  and	  chaoses.	  	  
	  
At	  this	  juncture,	  the	  future	  for	  both	  Africa	  and	  the	  world	  needs	  to	  be	  worked	  out.	  
What	  it	  will	  look	  like	  is	  difficult	  to	  say,	  but	  it	  will	  resemble	  neither	  a	  thesis	  nor	  a	  
fragment,	  neither	  a	  discourse	  nor	  an	  oral	  transmission,	  neither	  an	  informal	  economy	  
nor	  a	  trade	  agreement,	  but	  something	  in	  between,	  something	  necessarily	  equivocal.	  
An	  equivocity	  that	  always	  manages	  to	  renew	  an	  inextinguishable	  faith	  not	  only	  in	  
words	  and	  in	  forms,	  but	  also	  and	  above	  all	  in	  some	  confused	  and	  obscure	  magic	  of	  
the	  verb.	  Words	  and	  forms	  (or	  writing	  and	  Books)	  are	  what	  help	  us	  to	  consolidate	  
our	  thinking	  knowing	  that	  such	  consolidations	  are	  only	  made	  up	  of	  mere	  inauthentic	  
predicates	  and	  concepts	  that	  have	  no	  value,	  but	  their	  passing	  away	  and	  that	  such	  an	  
odd	  valence	  can	  infer	  no	  real	  hegemonic	  power	  and	  this	  however	  much	  we	  abide	  to	  
them.	  Similarly,	  the	  confused	  and	  obscure	  magic	  of	  the	  verb	  are	  what	  helps	  us	  
designate	  without	  concepts	  what	  precisely	  escapes	  all	  concepts	  (i.e.	  being-­‐third)	  and	  
that	  such	  an	  odd	  designation	  has	  not	  ‘a’	  value,	  but	  an	  absolute	  value	  that	  has	  no	  
purchase	  on	  words	  and	  forms	  and	  this,	  however	  much	  science	  and	  philosophy	  in	  
particular	  wish	  it	  otherwise.	  Ouattara	  is	  pointing	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  this	  equivocal	  




There	  is	  one	  final	  aspect	  of	  Ouattara’s	  work	  to	  date	  that	  is	  perhaps	  worth	  
considering	  as	  a	  conclusion.	  In	  order	  to	  indirectly	  refer	  to	  Africa	  as	  being-­‐third	  or	  as	  
authentic	  Dasein	  in	  his	  novel	  Le	  Cimetière	  sénégalais,	  Ouattara	  distinguishes	  
between	  Africa	  (inauthentic)	  and	  a	  generic	  (authentic)	  unidentified	  region	  south	  of	  
the	  Sahara.	  Referring	  to	  the	  astronomer	  and	  geographer,	  Claudius	  Ptolemy,	  he	  calls	  
this	  region,	  ‘Agisymba’	  (Ouattara	  2006:	  15).	  A	  few	  reasons	  force	  us	  to	  pay	  attention	  
to	  this	  unusual	  denomination.	  Firstly,	  the	  fact	  that	  Ouattara	  mentions	  Ptolemy	  is	  
indicative	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  reference	  at	  stake	  here	  since	  Ptolemy	  was	  Egyptian	  and	  
therefore	  African	  and	  yet	  he	  wrote	  in	  Greek.	  Not	  unlike	  Ouattara,	  Ptolemy	  straddles	  
not	  just	  two	  continents,	  but	  also	  and	  above	  all,	  two	  approaches	  to	  the	  world.	  If	  
Ptolemy	  is	  a	  Hellenized	  Egyptian,	  then	  Ouattara	  is,	  like	  Ptolemy,	  a	  Hellenized	  African.	  
This	  does	  not	  automatically	  classify	  him	  in	  the	  category	  of	  North-­‐bound	  gazing	  
African	  philosophers.	  This,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  encapsulates	  the	  problematic	  at	  stake	  
here:	  to	  be	  Hellenized	  is	  to	  adhere	  to	  writing	  and	  the	  Book	  and	  yet	  to	  be	  of	  African	  
origin	  or	  descent	  necessarily	  perverts	  this	  adherence,	  preventing	  it	  from	  turning	  its	  
necessarily	  unbound	  subjectivity	  into	  an	  authorial	  and	  thereby	  an	  authoritative	  
determination.	  In	  this	  way,	  like	  Ptolemy,	  Ouattara	  remains	  faithfully	  being-­‐third	  in	  
the	  sense	  we’ve	  uncovered,	  that	  is,	  equivocally.	  
	  
Secondly,	  Ptolemy	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  geographers	  to	  attribute	  names	  to	  what	  was	  
then	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘terra	  incognita’.	  Ptolemy’s	  Geography	  tells	  the	  unfinished	  story	  
that	  according	  to	  Marinus	  of	  Tyre,	  the	  trader	  Iulius	  Maternus	  together	  with	  the	  king	  
of	  the	  Garamantes	  set	  off	  from	  Garama	  in	  today’s	  Southern	  Libya	  and,	  after	  four	  
months	  and	  14	  days,	  reached	  a	  land	  called	  Agisymba,	  where	  they	  saw	  a	  great	  
number	  of	  rhinoceros	  (Desanges	  1985).	  With	  this	  incomplete	  story	  and	  a	  scientific	  
approach	  (calculating	  latitudes	  and	  longitudes),	  Ptolemy	  effectively	  took	  the	  
measure	  of	  an	  unknown	  world,	  figured	  it,	  and	  provided	  it	  with	  an	  ideological	  slant:	  
the	  other	  beyond	  the	  Sahara.	  To	  reference	  such	  denomination	  is	  not	  to	  offer	  yet	  
another	  alternative	  concept	  to	  the	  denomination	  ‘Africa’	  or	  to	  recall	  some	  imaginary	  
or	  mythical	  pre-­‐colonial	  past.	  Ptolemy’s	  confirmation	  that	  this	  land	  is	  called	  
Agisymba	  is	  both	  a	  scientific	  conceptualization	  and	  the	  remnant	  of	  a	  story:	  a	  
fragment,	  the	  ruin	  of	  a	  story.	  Such	  equivocation	  is	  precisely	  what	  makes	  Ouattara’s	  
reference	  in	  Le	  Cimetière	  sénégalais	  
and	  therefore	  historical	  reference,	  the	  hero	  comes	  from	  an	  equivocal	  land:	  at	  once	  
mark	  and	  ruin,	  concept	  and	  fragment.	  
	  
At	  a	  time	  when	  the	  geographical	  borders	  drawn	  by	  European	  powers	  during	  the	  
1884-­‐85	  Berlin	  Conference	  and	  in	  the	  subsequent	  Scramble	  for	  Africa	  are	  still	  being	  
disputed,	  one	  could	  question	  Ouattara’s	  intentions	  for	  referring	  to	  sub-­‐Saharan	  
Africa	  as	  Agisymba.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  Ouattara	  is	  not	  nostalgic	  of	  pre-­‐colonial	  
Africa;	  his	  intentions	  are	  in	  fact	  to	  give	  us,	  and	  Africans	  specifically,	  the	  possibility	  of	  
thinking	  another	  future.	  With	  a	  reference	  lost	  in	  some	  immemorial	  time,	  Ouattara	  
effectively	  points	  to	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  invented,	  what	  is	  still	  to	  be	  imagined.	  The	  
immemorial	  provided	  by	  the	  combination	  concept/fragment	  here	  folds	  itself	  onto	  
the	  incalculable,	  the	  un-­‐programmable,	  what	  is	  beyond	  all	  forms	  of	  projection	  or	  
prediction.	  In	  this	  way,	  Agisymba	  is	  not	  just	  a	  literary	  conceit,	  it	  offers	  the	  possibility	  
of	  thinking	  a	  future	  for	  Africa	  that	  is	  tainted	  neither	  by	  a	  long	  history	  of	  violent	  
oppression,	  brutal	  rulings,	  and	  ruthless	  exploitation	  by	  the	  concept	  nor	  by	  a	  mythical	  
past,	  an	  imaginary	  history,	  or	  an	  intuitive	  a-­‐conceptuality,	  but	  something	  both	  new	  
and	  very	  old,	  something	  equivocal,	  uncertain,	  open	  to	  repetition	  and	  interpretation,	  
orality	  and	  textuality.	  Unhinged	  and	  without	  direction,	  that	  is,	  without	  occident	  or	  
orient,	  Ouattara	  gives	  humanity,	  with	  Agisymba,	  ‘an	  anomaly,’	  which	  is	  nothing	  else	  
but	  a	  new	  destiny	  for	  Africa.	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1	  On	  this	  topic,	  see	  V.Y.	  Mudimbe	  1988:	  155-­‐57.	  
2	  A	  mention	  of	  his	  work	  can	  be	  found	  in	  two	  anthologies	  on	  African	  Philosophy,	  that	  
of	  Grégoire	  Biyogo	  and	  Hubert	  Mono	  Ndjana.	  See	  Bibliography.	  
3	  This	  and	  all	  subsequent	  translations	  of	  Ouattara’s	  work	  are	  mine.	  
4	  Ouattara	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  juxtaposing	  African	  thought	  and	  Heidegger’s	  work.	  I’m	  
thinking	  specifically	  here	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Antoine-­‐Dover	  Osongo-­‐Lukadi,	  especially	  his	  
work	  published	  in	  2001	  and	  2002.	  I	  can	  only	  leave	  here	  for	  another	  time,	  the	  task	  of	  
comparing	  both	  their	  work.	  	  
5	  There	  is	  no	  space	  here	  to	  explore	  these	  well-­‐known	  pairings.	  See,	  for	  example,	  
amongst	  others,	  John	  Llewllyn	  1988:	  237-­‐88	  and	  Miriam	  Leonard	  2010:	  17-­‐42.	  
6	  On	  this	  topic,	  see	  Geeta	  Kapur	  2003.	  
7	  Although	  Ouattara	  reference	  only	  rarely	  the	  work	  of	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  it	  is	  worth	  
noting	  here	  that	  the	  other	  of	  writing	  is	  not	  the	  other	  of	  arch-­‐writing	  or	  écriture.	  
Writing,	  for	  Ouattara	  seems	  to	  be	  confined	  to	  the	  marking	  of	  signs	  and	  not	  to	  
significant	  phenomena.	  If	  the	  latter	  had	  been	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  syntagm	  
‘Other/Concept’	  would	  have	  necessitated	  a	  completely	  different	  set	  of	  analyses	  
involving,	  amongst	  others,	  the	  only	  author	  who	  bravely	  withstood	  Heidegger’s	  
enclosed	  ontology	  and	  that	  curiously,	  but	  revealingly,	  Ouattara	  frequently	  dismisses,	  
Emmanuel	  Levinas.	  On	  the	  topic,	  see	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  2001:	  97-­‐196.	  
8	  For	  a	  revealing	  example	  of	  such	  writing	  and	  systematization,	  see	  Danielle	  de	  Lame	  
2005.	  	  
9	  Geoges	  Bataille’s	  notion	  of	  General	  Economy	  is	  mainly	  developed	  in	  two	  texts,	  ‘The	  
Notion	  of	  Expenditure’	  and,	  of	  course,	  The	  Accursed	  Share	  (specifically	  Vol.	  2).	  In	  a	  
nutshell,	  this	  notion	  of	  economy	  is	  intended	  to	  challenge	  the	  belief	  (held	  by	  both	  
Capitalism	  and	  Communism)	  in	  the	  primacy	  of	  economy	  as	  the	  sphere	  of	  meaning,	  
production,	  and	  exchange.	  For	  Bataille,	  economy	  is	  not	  just	  what	  seeks	  to	  make	  
society	  a	  controllable	  and	  controlled	  phenomenon:	  the	  realm	  of	  work,	  religion,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
utility,	  politics,	  laws,	  taboos,	  reproductive	  sex,	  truth,	  and	  knowledge.	  Economy	  is	  
also	  the	  unruly	  realms	  of	  eroticism,	  festivals,	  transgression,	  drunkenness,	  laughter,	  
the	  dissolution	  of	  truth,	  and	  art.	  General	  Economy	  is	  therefore	  not	  the	  opposite	  of	  
economy;	  it	  is	  what	  contains	  together	  economy	  as	  utility	  and	  economy	  as	  excess.	  An	  
awareness	  of	  both	  moderates	  the	  western	  economic	  system	  of	  production	  and	  
accumulation.	  	  
10	  For	  a	  remarkable	  analysis	  of	  this	  notion,	  see	  William	  Rasch	  1992:	  61-­‐76.	  
11	  For	  a	  recent	  analysis	  of	  orality	  in	  African	  culture,	  see	  Mamoussé	  Diagne	  2005.	  	  
12	  There	  is	  unfortunately	  no	  space	  here	  to	  examine	  in	  detail	  this	  aspect	  of	  
Heidegger’s	  work,	  let	  alone	  compare	  it	  with	  pre-­‐colonial	  Africa.	  For	  the	  most	  
succinct	  and	  accurate	  interpretation	  of	  the	  fourfold,	  see	  Reiner	  Schürmann	  1990:	  pp.	  
209-­‐225,	  fn.	  158,	  p.	  348.	  See	  also	  more	  specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  space	  and	  time,	  
Jean-­‐Paul	  Martinon	  2015.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  an	  account	  of	  the	  perception	  of	  space	  
and	  time	  in	  pre-­‐colonial	  Africa,	  contrast,	  for	  example,	  Alexis	  Kagame	  1975	  with	  John	  
S.	  Mbiti	  1990:	  especially	  199-­‐22	  and	  209.	  
